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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
CHANZY WALKER : Case No. 20090150-SC 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appellant Chanzy Walker has asked this Court to recognize that the state 
exclusionary rule is based in the Utah Constitution, and to apply the rule here to suppress 
evidence obtained in connection with an illegal warrant for a blood draw. Also, she has 
asked this Court to reject a "good-faith" exception to the rule under Utah law. Br. of 
App't, Arg. I. 
In response, the State has raised several issues. First, it urges this Court to reject 
the primacy model for analysis when issues are raised under both the state and federal 
constitutions. See. State's Replacement Brief ("SRB"), 14. Second, it asks this Court to 
reverse the trial court's ruling that the warrant lacked probable case. M 30. Third, it 
claims this Court should abolish the exclusionary rule under Utah law. M 48. And 
fourth, as an alternative argument, it asks this Court to apply a good-faith exception to the 
Utah exclusionary rule to salvage the illegal search. M 50. Walker has responded to 
each claim, as set forth below. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
A. SOUND POLICY, UTAH CASE LAW, AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
SUPPORT GREATER PROTECTIONS UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
AND APPLICATION OF THE PRIMACY MODEL. 
The State has asked this Court to adopt the interstitial model when reviewing 
claims raised under both the state and federal constitutions. SRB 9, 10, 15. According to 
the State, the interstitial model - and its focus on federal analysis - will adequately 
address the issues, making an analysis under the Utah constitution superfluous and 
confusing. M 17-19. In addition, the State claims that the evolution of Utah's art. I, § 
14, and the state convention debates suggest the framers were "satisfied" with federal 
protections, id_ 25, and they intended Utah courts to interpret state constitutional 
provisions to mirror federal law. Id^ 19, 25-29. The State's arguments are misplaced. 
(1) This Court Has Specified a Preference for the Primacy Model. 
(a) The Primacy Model Is in Accord with the Federal System.. 
In West v. Thomson Newspapers, this Court stated, "the question frequently arises 
whether the court should address [an] issue under the state constitution, the federal con-
stitution, or both." 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994). To answer that question, the Court 
recognized the importance of the primacy analysis, where "'a state court looks first to 
state constitutional law, develops independent doctrine and precedent, and decides federal 
questions only when state law is not dispositive.'" IcL at 1006 (cite omitted). 
1
 See State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, ^  11, 232 P.3d 519 ("an analysis under [art. I, § 12,] 
is in order given this court's endorsement of the primacy model"); State v. Tiedemann, 
2007 UT 49, T| 33, 162 P.3d 1106 (the State "is not correct" in claiming that a federal 
2 
This Court approved the primacy model in West, stating it is consistent with the 
original purpose of the federal system. Id_ at 1006. Before incorporation of the Federal 
Bill of Rights, "state constitutions were the only source of protection for individual rights 
and have continued as important sources of such rights ever since." IcL Thus, state 
courts developed doctrine under state law to facilitate the independent role of state courts 
and constitutions in the federal system. See_ icL_ at 1006-07 & nn. 9, 10. 
analysis is the "default interpretative stance of this court vis-a-vis state law"; "[t]his 
court" has the "authority and obligation to interpret Utah's constitutional guarantees," 
and "it is part of the inherent logic of federalism that state law be interpreted 
independently and prior to consideration of federal questions"); State v. Worwood, 2007 
UT 47, \ 15, 164 P.3d 397 ("When interpreting state constitutional provisions that are 
similar or identical to those in the federal constitution, we encourage a primacy 
approach," to "'develop[] independent doctrine and precedent'"); American Bush v. City 
of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, If 7, 140 P.3d 1235 ("In light of this court's support of 
the primacy model . . . we take this opportunity to elucidate the constitutional under-
pinnings of our holding that the Utah Constitution does not protect nude dancing from the 
reach of the South Salt Lake City ordinance at issue here") (internal cite omitted); State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, | 25, 103 P.3d 699 (relying on "Utah law" in discussing search-and-
seizure analysis; and citing to State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990), with 
approval); State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, f 33, 137 P.3d 726 ("Because this court has 
endorsed the primacy approach to constitutional challenges, whereby we first attempt to 
resolve constitutional challenges by appealing to our state constitution . . . we first 
analyze whether Holm's conduct is protected pursuant to the Utah Constitution"); State v. 
Abell, 2003 UT 20, ffifl, 17, 70 P.3d 98 (addressing the constitutionality of a checkpoint 
plan under art. I, § 14; and reviewing federal cases solely for "persuasive value"); Society 
ofSeparationists v. Whitehead* 870 P.2d 916, 917, 930-31 & n.36 (Utah 1993) 
(addressing prayer in city council meetings under Utah's art. I, § 4); State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991) (for purposes of determining the reliability of eyewitness 
identification under art. I, § 7, "we will not limit ourselves to an analytical model that 
merely copies the federal" model); Amex Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm yn, 796 P.2d 
1256, 1261 (Utah 1990) ("[I]f the challenged statute cannot withstand attack under the 
state constitution, there is no reason to reach the federal question"); Jeffs v. Stuffs, 970 
P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) (if a party asserts claims under the state and federal 
constitutions, "this court ordinarily first determines the issue under the Utah Constitution 
and only resorts to the federal Constitution if the state constitution is not dispositive"). 
3 
In addition, the primacy model does not interfere with federal law. Id_ at 1006. 
The United States Supreme Court has expressed that state courts have a duty to develop 
adequate independent state law analysis. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 
(1983). In Long, the Court ruled, "Respect for the independence of state courts" is a 
"cornerstone[] of this Court's refusal to decide cases" resolved on adequate and 
independent state grounds. Id at 1041. Also, it expressed a desire to have state courts 
develop "state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference." Id. at 1041. 
Moreover, the primacy method is a principled approach to addressing issues under 
both state and federal provisions; it "is necessary as a matter of comity toward federal 
courts." West, 872 P.2d at 1005 n.6. It may be inappropriate for a state court first to 
address an issue under federal law, and then to insulate itself from federal review by re-
jecting that law for its own state analysis. See id In State v. Badger, the court cautioned 
against an approach that would resolve an issue under federal law, but would leave the 
door open for further review under a state constitutional analysis if a federal court dis-
agreed with the matter. 450 A.2d 336, 346-47 (Vt. 1982). It stated that in several cases, 
after federal review, a state court had "quickly reversed" a federal analysis and relied on 
state grounds for the result, creating the potential for "friction between the state and 
federal judiciaries, and concomitant damage to the authority, efficiency, and finality of 
the United States Supreme Court." Id at 347 (cite omitted). "The United States Supreme 
Court should not be so vulnerable to collateral attack." Id^ Also, state courts should not 
be so willing to waste scarce resources on multiple levels of review: When issues raised 
4 
in state court are resolved first under state law, the process is efficient and provides 
closure. See^ West, 872 P.2d at 1005 n.6 (recognizing issues in a defamation case could 
have been addressed first under state law, saving "another trip to Washington" and a year 
of litigation) (cite omitted); see also id. at 1006-07 n.9 (citing primacy model cases). 
(b) Development of State Law Under the Primacy Model Provides Predictability 
in the Jurisdiction. 
The State claims this Court applied the interstitial model in State v. Ott, 2010 UT 
1, — P.3d —; and State v. Brizzs, 2008 UT 83, 199 P.3d 935. 5 ^ S R B 1 5 . YetinOtt, 
the defendant did not raise individual claims under both the state and federal 
constitutions. Specifically, the State charged the defendant with several offenses, 
including aggravated murder. Ott, 2001 UT 1, ^ f 1. The defendant entered an Alford plea 
for the guilt/innocence phase of trial and proceeded with a jury trial for sentencing. IcL ^ 
1,9-10. The jury voted to sentence Ott to prison for life without the possibility of parole, 
and he appealed. IcL ffl[ 10-11. He raised unpreserved issues under the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel doctrine, claiming trial counsel failed to (i) challenge a statute 
under the Utah Constitution, (ii) object to sentencing evidence under Utah case law, and 
(iii) object to victim impact testimony that violated the Federal Constitution. IcL f 24. 
Because the defendant framed the individual issues in terms of either state or 
federal law, this Court was not required to choose between the primacy and interstitial 
model to address each claim. Rather, based on the proceedings, it determined to resolve 
the third issue: whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object under the federal 
constitution to inadmissible victim impact evidence. See icL ^ 26. That resolution 
5 
allowed the Court to reverse the proceedings without declaring a statute unconstitutional. 
M f^ 24 n.3. That approach was not at odds with the primacy model, and in fact was 
consistent with this Court's mandate that state constitutional issues must be developed 
first in the trial court. Worwood* 2007 UT 47, ^ flj 14, 16 ("We have repeatedly instructed 
counsel" to "preserve and develop" state constitutional claims, and to raise the issue to 
"
ca level of consciousness'" to allow the trial court to address it) (note omitted). 
Next, in Briggs, this Court considered whether Utah's sex-registration statute 
violated procedural due process. 2008 UT 83,1} 23. It recognized that the state and 
federal constitutions contained identical due process clauses; the Utah Constitution 
provided more expansive protections; and this Court was not bound by federal 
interpretations. IcL j^ 24. Also, this Court discussed the order in which it would resolve 
textually similar state and federal provisions. It stated that parties often will frame their 
arguments "in terms of either the Utah Constitution or the federal Constitution. In some 
instances, resolving the case using the Utah Constitution renders the clearest result, and 
so we will resolve the case with reference only to the Utah Constitution." IdL ^ 25 (notes 
omitted). In Briggs, the Court looked to federal law as the starting place for the analysis, 
and it ruled that procedures in Briggs's case failed to meet that minimum standard. 
Consequently, according to the majority, it was not necessary at that point to build on that 
law for protections under Utah's art. I, § 7. Id. ^[ 26-27. Proper analysis under the 
primacy model likewise would have revealed the same procedural violations in the case. 
Utah courts should adhere to the primacy model except in circumstances where the 
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parties have framed their arguments "entirely in terms of either" the Utah or Federal 
Constitution, ici U 25; or where the parties have failed to preserve or adequately brief 
application of one provision or the other. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^ 14-16. "[C]ourts 
that fail to adhere to a consistent method of addressing state and federal constitutional 
issues are commonly criticized as result-oriented," West, 872 P.2d at 1005; they fail to 
give guidance to trial courts or parties; and they create confusion and undermine the 
relevance of state law. See Milo S. Marsden, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319, 321 (the Utah Supreme Court "has not 
developed a consistent approach for cases in which both state and federal constitutional 
claims are made"). Since the primacy model is consistent with this Court's invitation to 
parties to preserve and adequately brief issues under the Utah Constitution, see_ Br. of 
App't, 10-12, this Court should affirm the primacy model as the only proper analysis for 
claims raised under textually similar state and federal constitutional provisions. 
(2) The History and Text of the Utah Constitution and Utah Case Law Support 
Application of the Primacy Model and Broader Protections for Utahns. 
(a) Utah's Unique History Supports Primacy and Broader Protections. 
The State claims that Utah settlers were satisfied with federal protections and the 
framers of the state constitution intended Utah courts to interpret state provisions to 
mirror federal law. SRB 25. But territorial settlers were not satisfied with the oppressive 
acts of the federal government. After pioneers were driven from their homes in Illinois 
and across several states, they arrived in the Salt Lake valley where they were subjected 
to abuse, raids, and deprivations at the hands of federal officials. See_ Br. of App't, Arg. 
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I.C.(l). Those experiences left settlers anxious for their own government: they "sought 
statehood for their new home, referred to as the 'State of Deseret,' and the self-
government that such a status would bring." Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 922; 
see also id. at 926 ("statehood would be a means of avoiding" federal anti-polygamy law, 
"which did not apply in the states, only in the territories"). Also, "admission as a state 
would free the Mormons from judicial interpretations of the [Federal] First Amendment, 
which had yet to be applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id^ 
However, the first attempt at statehood in 1849 "foundered over the national issue 
of slavery when Congress designated Utah as a 'slave' territory in the Compromise of 
1850." IcL at 922. Then in 1852, prior to the Civil War, LDS Church authorities 
acknowledged the doctrine of plural marriage as a divinely instituted obligation for 
Church members. Linda Thatcher, A Chronology of Utah Statehood, 1995 Beehive 
History, no. 21, at 29 ("Beehive History"). That announcement - together with the 
designation as a slave territory - caused hostility and opposition to Utah's efforts at 
statehood. Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 923. 
During the Civil War, Congress began to pass a series of Acts aimed directly at the 
people in the Utah territory. See. tiL at 924 & n.17. The legislation allowed federal con-
2
 Utah delegates contemplated other attempts at statehood and submitted "an 
amended version of the constitution of 1862 to the people for ratification." Society of 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 924. When that attempt failed, delegates tried a new approach 
in 1872 with a constitution "modeled after that of the state of Nevada, which had been 
recently admitted." IcL That attempt likewise was unsuccessful. Id. at 925. 
3
 The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862 prohibited plural marriage, "'disincor-
porated]"' the Mormon Church, and restricted Church ownership of property. Society of 
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trol over territorial matters; and federal enforcers embittered Mormons by raiding homes, 
confiscating and threatening seizure of property, and imprisoning Church members or 
forcing them underground or into exile. See., Jean B. White, The Utah State Constitution, 
A Reference Guide, 7 (1998); Beehive History, 30, 31; see also State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 
32, Tf 26, 996 P.2d 546 (discussing Utah's early settlers and the abuse of general war-
rants); Br. of App't, Arg. I.C.(l). In 1882 and in 1887, territorial citizens made additional 
unsuccessful attempts at statehood. Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 926. They 
believed that as an autonomous state, they would no longer be governed by federal laws. 
Id. But statehood efforts were in vain until LDS Church President Wilford Woodruff 
ended polygamy "in what is known as the 'Manifesto.'" I(L at 927; see also supra n. 3. 
These events, which took place over Utah's 47-year effort at statehood, were fresh 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 924 (cite omitted). Since Mormons were in control of the 
judicial system, the federal government had difficulty enforcing the Act. hL 
Consequently, after the Civil War, several additional anti-Mormon bills were introduced 
in Congress, uL at 924 n.17, including the Poland Act of 1874, which "became the legal 
basis for prosecuting Mormon polygamists," as it allowed federal control over district 
courts and their functions. Beehive History, 30; People v. Pyper, 6 Utah 160, 21 P. 722, 
723 (Terr. 1889). In 1882, Congress amended the Morrill Act with the Edmunds Act. It 
prohibited Church members from voting, serving on juries, and holding office; and it 
allowed the federal government to supervise elections, and to prosecute Church members 
in federal court for cohabitation. Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 926; Beehive 
History, 31. And in 1887, Congress passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act to annul the charter 
of incorporation of the Church, and to appoint trustees to care for and sell Church pro-
perty "for the support of the common schools in the territory." Society ofSeparationists, 
870 P.2d at 926-27 (cite omitted). Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court issued a 
series of opinions upholding the oppressive congressional legislation. See. ici_ at 926-27 
& n.23. Within months of the Supreme Court opinion affirming the Edmunds-Tucker 
Act, Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1 
(1890), the president of the Mormon Church announced the end to polygamy, and the 
territory made its final bid for statehood. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 927-28. 
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in the memories of those who drafted the Utah Constitution. One month after Utah be-
came the 45th state, this Court ruled that statehood meant independence. See_ State ex rel 
Bishop v. McNally, 13 Utah 25, 43 P. 920 (1896). It ruled that as a territory, Utah derived 
its authority "from congress, and congress derive[d] its authority from the people of the 
United States." IcL at 920. But as a state, "the[ government derives its authority from 
the people of the state. The [state] is a sovereignty." IcL "The people exercised sovereign 
power in adopting their state government." IcL The path to statehood supports that 
Utahns did not intend the state constitution to take a backseat to the Federal Constitution. 
(b) Excerpts from the Constitutional Convention Support the Supreme Authority 
of the Utah Constitution in this State. 
The State claims that convention delegates intended the Federal Bill of Rights to 
serve as an inspiration for interpretation of the state constitutional provisions. See_ SRB 
26. It asserts that framers intended to build upon "the foundation of the 'great parent bill 
of rights.'" IcL 27 (cite omitted). And it claims that where Utah's constitutional 
provisions are similar to federal provisions, federal law assists Utah courts in interpreting 
Utah's protections. See id. 29-30. 
This Court, likewise, has recognized that it will consider federal analysis when 
interpreting state provisions. AbelL 2003 UT 20, Tf 17 (federal analysis is considered for 
its "persuasive value"). It has stated that "federal rulings set the floor for federal 
constitutional protections which we must respect in interpreting the scope of our own 
constitution's protections." Society of Separationists* 870 P.2d at 940. In addition, it has 
ruled that it will build on federal law to develop "'independent doctrine and precedent'" 
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under the Utah Constitution, Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^ j 15 (cite omitted), and to provide 
"greater protections" to Utahns. IcL f 16. But this Court is not bound by the outer limits 
of modern federal interpretations even when state and federal provisions are textually 
identical. See ULYi 15-16; see also Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 (urging state judges to make 
clear that federal law is used only for guidance in analyzing state constitutions). 
Also, the State points to comments from delegates about individual constitutional 
provisions to claim that when framers borrowed from the federal provisions, "they 
intended that the state right 'adherfej to the Constitution of the United States' - that it not 
'be considered in a different way.5" SRB 30 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Official Report 
of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on the 4th 
Day of March, 1895, to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah ("Proceedings"), 326, 
257); SRB 29-30 (Delegate Varian stated a provision should be left in "ancient land-
marks"). Yet with respect to the emphasized language above, the debates show that 
Delegate Eichnor was referring to art. I, § 21, the prohibition on slavery. He stated that 
Utah's provision "is the language of the Constitution of the United States," and "I believe 
in adhering to the Constitution of the United States when we copy it." 1 Proceedings, 
326 (emphasis added). In context, Eichnor believed if framers copied language from the 
Federal Constitution, they should do so verbatim. IcL His statement does not support 
mirrored construction, since he made no mention of interpretation for that provision. Id* 
4
 Since the federal government had branded Utah as a slave territory, it was 
important for framers to stick to or adhere to the language of the Federal Constitution 
word for word for art. I, sec. 21. Indeed, the final draft of the Utah Constitution mirrored 
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In addition, there is nothing to suggest that Eichnor's statement - or the statements 
of other delegates in referring to the federal constitution - would apply beyond the debate 
for the language of a specific provision, or that the particular statement represented the 
sentiment of other delegate members. See_ id:, see also 1 Proceedings 257 (agreeing to 
amended language, but making no mention as to whether delegates believed that state 
provisions should be construed to mirror federal provisions). Since delegates relied on 44 
state constitutions, the Federal Bill of Rights, and other sources, their references to 
established or "ancient landmarks" in the law (see 1 Proceedings 308) may have related 
to any number of sources. IcL_ at 307-08 (stating the provision at issue is "in every 
constitution" and referring to "[jjudicial decision after decision"). They intended to be 
diplomatic in charting a new course: they had discussions "all the summer through and all 
the winter" before the convention to ensure nonpartisan debate, 1 Proceedings, 900; and 
they formed a constitution that contained provisions relevant to Utahns5 to ensure an 
the Federal Constitution on that issue and it also irrevocably prohibited polygamy: the 
two obstacles to statehood and "the 'twin relics of barbarism.'" Society ofSeparationists, 
870 P.2d at 923 (cite omitted); Utah Const, art. I, § 21; Utah Const, art. Ill, Ordinance. 
5
 The delegates included numerous provisions that differed from the Federal 
Constitution, thereby demonstrating expanded and unique rights in Utah. For example, 
the Utah Constitution addresses religious freedoms and limitations at least four times. 
Utah Const, art. I, §§ 1 & 4; art. Ill, Ordinance; art. X, § 1. The right to bear arms is 
expressed in ways relevant to Utahns. Zrf. art. I, § 6. The framers included several and 
various rights associated with criminal proceedings - albeit not exclusively - and some of 
which may be found in other state constitutions and in the Federal Bill of Rights. See id, 
art. I, §§ 5-16. And after women were denied the opportunity under the Federal Enabling 
Act to vote on state officers and ratification of the Utah Constitution, see Anderson v. 
Tyree, 12 Utah 129, 42 P. 201, 202 (Utah Terr. 1895) (the right "to vote for or against the 
constitution rests on the enabling act of congress" which prohibits women's suffrage in 
12 
independent state government, and to guarantee the protections of their most sacred and 
pertinent rights. See_ Utah Const, art. I, § 25. 
But even where delegates copied certain federal provisions when they framed the 
Utah Constitution, they did not specify that this Court should be bound by every future 
interpretation of the United States Supreme Court, which may expand or contract a 
constitutional right. Indeed, the text of the Utah Constitution ensures the sanctity of the 
protections of the Declaration of Rights. Article I, § 26, specifies that state constitutional 
provisions are "mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to 
be otherwise." The Federal Bill of Rights does not contain similar language. This Court 
has given force and effect to the provisions enumerated in the Utah Declaration of Rights 
and other parts of the constitution. See Spackman v. Bd ofEduc. Box Elder Cnty Sch. 
DisU 2000 UT 87, ffl[ 10-12, 16 P.3d 533 (where provisions in the Declaration of Rights 
are "inarguably prohibitory," they are definable and enforceable). In addition, art. I, § 11, 
specifies that every person, who is injured "in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law." Utah Const, art. I, § 11. Again, the federal Bill of 
Rights does not contain similar language, and in Foote v. Utah Bd of Pardons, this Court 
relied on that provision together with the state due process clause to rule that "[i]t is the 
Utah, and requires voters to be male), the framers included a provision ensuring the right 
to vote to women. Utah Const, art. IV, § 1. 
6
 Setz 1 Proceedings 701 ("we came here" to "establish laws that will protect every 
man and woman in their inalienable rights"); id_ at 899 (the powers of the state should 
"[s]ay to all the people: 'the government shall protect you in your rights, in your liberties, 
in the pursuit of happiness, and it will leave you free in every other particular to carve out 
your own fortunes'"; also, statehood gives "increased powers" to the State). 
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province of the judiciary" to ensure that claims under the state constitution "be heard and, 
if justified, that [they] be vindicated." 808 P.2d 734, 734 (Utah 1991). Those provisions, 
the convention debates, and the text of the Utah Constitution support the supreme 
authority of the Utah Constitution in this state. 
(c) This Court Has Recognized Greater Protections Under the Utah Constitution. 
The State claims this Court has "held that Section 14 provides greater protection 
than the Fourth Amendment" in "only one circumstance." SRB 44 (identifying State v. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991)). Yet this Court has ruled that several provisions 
of the Utah Constitution provide greater protections than may be afforded under a federal 
counterpart. Also, this Court has invited parties to present claims for independent 
interpretation under the Utah Constitution. See Br. of App't, 10-11. Given Utah's 
history and case law, this Court is not confined to Fourth Amendment construction in 
interpreting the protections of Utah's art. I, § 14. 
B. THIS COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO REACH THE ISSUE OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE SINCE PROSECUTORS ACKNOWLEDGED THE 
DEFICIENCIES. ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT MAY RESOLVE THE 
ISSUE UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, *[flj 39-44 (rejecting federal analysis and developing 
state analysis for destruction of evidence); Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f^ 16 (art. I, § 14, 
"often provides greater protections to Utah citizens"); Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^  25 (citing to 
"Utah law" for search of a vehicle); State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995-96 (Utah 1995) 
(federal law does not resolve issues under art. I, § 24); Thompson, 810 P.2d at 417-18 
(relying on state law to protect bank records); Foote, 808 P.2d at 734-35 (recognizing 
protections under state due process); Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-71 (relying on state con-
stitution for a vehicle search); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984) (art. I, § 24 
is not controlled by federal construction and application of the Equal Protection Clause). 
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Applying the interstitial model, the State has asked this Court to reverse the trial 
court on the issue of probable cause. It claims the warrant affidavit here satisfied the 
federal standard, SRB 30, and thus, the Utah standard for probable cause. IcL 47-48. 
Yet this Court is not required to reach the issue of probable cause since prosecu-
tors acknowledged in trial court proceedings that the affidavit was deficient. See_ infra, 
Arg. B.(l). In the alternative, under the primacy model this Court may analyze the 
affidavit under Utah's art. I, § 14, and affirm the trial court's ruling. Infra, Arg. B.(2). 
(1) Prosecutors Acknowledged that the Warrant Affidavit Was Deficient. 
Although the trial court ruled that the warrant affidavit in this case was deficient, 
R. 196-97, the State has asked this Court to review the affidavit for probable cause as an 
alternative ground for affirmance. SRB 30. It claims the affidavit was sufficient because 
Walker's driving was erratic, she had a pattern of criminal behavior, she refused consent, 
and she gave evasive answers to police questions. See_ id. 32-31. 
This Court may affirm a trial court ruling on alternative grounds if the grounds are 
"apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ffi[ 10, 13-14, 52 P.3d 1158. Yet 
given the trial court proceedings here, the State cannot make that showing. Indeed, what 
is apparent is that frontline prosecutors made frank concessions about deficiencies in the 
affidavit. Specifically, on April 4, 2008, the trial court advised Prosecutor Bown that 
"[t]his warrant is a bit of a mess, it looks tome." R. 273:12. Bown agreed. He stated, 
BOWN: I'm not going to stand here and say: That's the greatest warrant I've ever 
seen, Your Honor. I don't want to lose my credibility on that one, so. . . . 
* * * 
BOWN: Well, I can't stand here and say that this is the greatest warrant that I've 
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ever seen, or [that] I'll use [it as] an example to show officers how to write search 
warrants. What I think it comes down to - I mean, it's a question of is the probable 
cause - what I've narrowed it down to, just looking through those search warrants 
because that's what I'm stuck with, I can't bring in any other facts; is a person by 
result of Chan[z]y Walker's driving, there was an unknown cause, which I don't 
think is the best way that they could have written it into the search warrant. 
COURT: But that's all we know. 
BOWN: Right. Well, and what [I] would [] say from ["]unknown cause["] is that 
- because it's unknown, we know from the testimony that she just drifted over. 
That's the other part. 
COURT: We don't know that. . . The magistrate didn't know that at the time. 
BOWN: Right. What I'm saying is just in the statement that the officer put in 
there, he says something to the effect -
COURT: Crossed to the left center - 1 mean, she went left of center. 
BOWN: For unknown reasons. 
* * * 
COURT: Do you think there's probable cause without the criminal history here? 
BOWN: No, I think - with the driving pattern by itself or an ["]unknown 
cause,["] and does the person by the result - and I guess one other - it's mainly a 
question because I know I'm treading on probably some possible other ground, but 
there is the refusal at the hospital. Now, it's done in the context of going to the -
saying, "I want to talk to my attorney about that." 
COURT: It's not a refusal in this case. . . . 
* * * 
. . . It's a, "I think I ought to talk to my lawyer first." 
BOWN: That's why I knew I was going to tread, and I wanted to see where you 
came down on that. And if that's taken out as well, I think it's worse off. We - if 
you have a person who died as a result of a driving pattern --
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COURT: Can I say - 1 mean, in terms of the legal analysis . . . 
* * * 
. . . it doesn't legally matter that there was a death. 
BOWN: Right. 
* * * 
COURT: It matters to the charge, but it could be a serious injury, or [no injury] 
* * * 
. . . I mean, . . . there's nothing about the fact that there is a fatality that changes 
the legal analysis here. 
BOWN: And I guess I should step back because I'm thinking of future cases. In 
this case, if all you have is a person dies, unknown cause, without the history, I 
don't have anything[. Yjou're right. I don't have any ability to make that logical 
(Inaudible) -
COURT: This affidavit, frankly, stinks a little bit. I mean, you're being kind 
when you say that it's not the best you've seen. 
R. 273:12-16. The prosecutor agreed. IcL at 16. He agreed that the officer "didn't do the 
best job he could have," id/, the affidavit was "highly troubling," id^ at 17-18; and the 
officer should have been more scrupulous in his request for a blood draw. IcL at 18 ("I'm 
not here . . . to defend the search warrant"). After the prosecutor acknowledged 
deficiencies in the affidavit, he claimed the search should be upheld under the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. See_ R. 273:20-21. The trial court then asked the 
parties to brief whether a blood draw required a more stringent analysis, and whether 
Utah law recognized the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See_ R. 273:34-35. 
In a later hearing, a second prosecutor attempted to salvage the argument for 
probable cause. But when the judge stated, "This affidavit is greatly troubling", the pro-
secutor said, "That's why it's the subject of training when we go out to police agencies". 
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R. 274:15. The judge continued: "I believe your predecessor in this argument indicated 
that he would never be using this affidavit in training officers what to do." R. 274:15. 
The prosecutor responded: "Exactly." R. 274:15. Also, she conceded the affidavit was 
"pretty slim." R. 274:19. The trial court later ruled it lacked probable cause. R. 196-97. 
Utah appellate courts have refused to review a trial court ruling if the party 
challenging that ruling made a strategic decision to agree with the trial court or to invite 
the court into error. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (a party cannot 
challenge a trial court ruling that it invited). In this case, prosecutors all but conceded the 
affidavit was defective. Se<e R. 273:12-19; 274:15. Given the admissions, this Court may 
reject the State's arguments here for probable cause. See_ Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. 
(2) The Record Fails to Support the State's Claims for Probable Cause. 
In the event this Court decides to review the trial court's ruling that the affidavit 
lacked probable cause, it should look first to the Utah Constitution. Article I, § 14, states 
that "no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause." Utah Const, art. I, § 14. In 
referring to that provision, this Court has ruled that federal law "providefs] a floor", 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, \\1, and this Court may build on that floor "to give the Utah 
Constitution a different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the 
rights of this state's citizens." DeBoow 2000 UT 32, ^ f 12. In that regard, federal courts 
have stated that probable cause centers on a fair and substantial probability that evidence 
of crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 243 n.13 
(1983); United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006). "Strong reason to suspect" is 
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not enough. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (probable cause requires more than "mere suspicion"). 
Moreover, a warrant affidavit may not be based on stale information. See, e.g., 
United States v. Cantu, 405 F.3d 1173, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2005) (information about an 
arrest made months earlier may be stale without facts indicating ongoing activity); SRB 
35 ("A person's history of past conduct may be so old that it does not contribute to 
probable cause"). Past conduct may add to the probable cause analysis if the affidavit 
recites facts supporting ongoing activity or a continuous pattern for the past and present 
conduct. See State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). But if the 
affidavit identifies a "mere isolated" past violation, probable cause "dwindles rather 
quickly with the passage of time." State v. Faber, 647 N.W.2d 67, 82 (Neb. 2002); State 
y. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 670 (Iowa 1996). 
In this case, the affidavit revealed that at 6:33 a.m. on Thursday, May 24, 2007, 
Walker's southbound Mustang crossed the centerline of a busy highway for an unknown 
reason and struck a trailer and then a car in the northbound lane of traffic. R. 78 
(indicating several witnesses). Walker was injured and had to be transported by 
helicopter to a hospital. In addition, the driver of a second car died at the scene. Id_ 
Officials dispatched Detective Adamson to the hospital to question Walker. See 
R. 88. Adamson did not go to the scene. IcL Walker introduced herself and agreed to 
talk. IcL She described the car she was driving (a Mustang) and where she was that 
morning (Bacchus Highway). Id, She told Adamson that her boss (Cameron Thomas) 
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owned the car. M And she said she had no memory of the accident but remembered 
other events: she heard that someone had died, she asked after "the victims," and she told 
Adamson she had contacted her family. IcL When Adamson asked for consent to draw 
blood, Walker did not give or withhold consent. Rather, she told Adamson "she thought 
she should talk to a lawyer first." IcL Adamson then included information in the affidavit 
from the criminal justice database that showed Walker's license was "revoked for 
alcohol," and she was "restricted to an interlock device until 2-27-2010." IcL 
(a) The Affidavit. The State claims the affidavit supported probable cause where 
Walker engaged in "erratic" driving, SRB 33; her history indicated "a pattern or disposi-
tion to drive while impaired" with two episodes as recent as "three months before the 
accident" here, UL 34-36; she "refus[ed] to consent to a blood draw without first speaking 
with her attorney," supporting probable cause for "impairment," idL 36; and "she did not 
remember anything about the accident," UL 33, which "may be viewed as evasive." IcL_ 
37. Yet the affidavit did not describe "erratic" driving; it did not describe a "pattern or 
disposition to drive while impaired"; and it did not indicate that Walker was impaired 
within "three months" of the accident., See R. 78, 88. Also, Walker did not refuse 
consent for a blood draw: she asked to "talk to a lawyer." R. 88. And as reflected in the 
affidavit, Walker remembered events and answered questions. IcL She was not evasive. 
The affidavit itself fails to support the conclusory interpretation urged by the State. 
SRB 32-37. Thus, the State's argument for affirmance on alternative grounds is not 
"apparent on the record." Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ^  10. 
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(b) The Total Circumstances. The circumstances fail to support probable cause, 
(i) Walker's car crossed the centerline for "an unknown reason". In 
connection with preparing the warrant affidavit, Detective Adamson did not go to the 
scene of the accident. R. 88. He learned from investigators on the scene that Walker's 
southbound vehicle crossed the centerline of a two-lane road for "an unknown reason" 
and struck a trailer and a second vehicle. IcL 78. The "unknown reason" could have been 
a mechanical problem, driver inattention, a cell phone call, or any number of reasons 
unrelated to alcohol impairment. 
In this case, Adamson did not disclose that the accident occurred where 
southbound traffic merged from two lanes to one. R. 78, 88, State's Ex. 2. He did not 
describe anything recovered from the accident, R. 78, 88; and he did not receive reports 
of, or describe, erratic driving. IcL\ see_ State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, fflf 3-4, 173 
P.3d 213 (witnesses described dangerous driving where the defendant ran a car off the 
road, swerved in front of and nearly hit a semi-truck, and swerved several times across 
the entire road before crashing into a parked trailer; also, the defendant exhibited 
impaired conduct with slurred speech and panicky behavior); United States v. Rehkop, 96 
F.3d 301, 305 (8 Cir. 1996) (suspect sat at a stoplight through three rotations, weaved in 
and out of his lane four times, and ran a red light for probable cause). In comparison, the 
reports about Walker's driving did not rise to the level of probable cause. See, e.g.. State 
v. Pepin, 920 A.2d 1209, 1212 (N.H. 2007) (beyond a brief tire squeal, the officer 
observed no erratic driving to support reasonable suspicion); Sandy City v. Thorsness, 
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778 P.2d 1011,1013 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Defendant did not engage in reckless, erratic 
driving patterns," thus, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion). 
(ii) Walker's reference to counsel does not add to the probable cause 
analysis. When Adamson requested consent for a blood draw, Walker responded that she 
should speak to an attorney first. Her response invoked a constitutional right. See Utah 
Const, art. I, §§ 7, 12. The State claims that Walker's response qualified as a "refusal" 
and "supports a probable cause determination of impairment." SRB 36. Yet, in 
construing the Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that a 
person has a right to refuse to cooperate or to withhold consent. See Florida v. Rover, 
460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (a person is free to "decline to listen to the questions" and 
"may go on his way"). A refusal to submit to a police request "does not furnish the 
minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure." Florida v. 
Bostich 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). Under the total circumstances, Walker's statement 
that she should talk to a lawyer adds nothing to the probable-cause determination. 
Moreover, at the point when Adamson requested consent, he had no information to 
suggest drugs or impairment. See R. 88 (describing coherent conversation). The State 
seems to acknowledge as much. SRB 34. Adamson did not describe emotional 
instability, he did not indicate that Walker was unable to respond to basic questions or to 
8
 The State acknowledges that Walker had "no physiological signs of impairment." 
SRB 34. Also, it suggests the signs must have been present earlier and they were difficult 
to detect given Walker's injuries or the passage of time. IdL The State relies on 
assumptions and suppositions, which are "insufficient to establish" criminal activity for a 
warrant. See Commonwealth v. Luton, 672 A.2d 819, 822 (Pa. Super. 1996); State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) (disapproving of remote hearsay or assumption). 
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her surroundings, he did not claim that she was unable to focus, and he did not describe 
symptoms indicative of impaired behavior, i.e., slurred speech, sluggishness, the odor of 
alcohol, or blood shot eyes. See R. 88; see also Worwood, 2007 UT 47, fflf 26, 34-36 
(describing observations to support an officer's reasonable suspicion). Likewise, he did 
not indicate that officers at the scene had detected any odor or discovered an empty 
bottle, pills, or the like. R. 78, 88. Consequently, Adamson relied in the affidavit on 
cursory information about Walker's license restrictions: He stated the "Utah Criminal 
Justice Information System revealed" that Walker's driver's license was "revoked for 
alcohol" and she was "restricted to an interlock device until 2-27-2010." IdL at 88. 
(iii) Information about Walker's driving restrictions was ambiguous and 
stale. The State claims that information about the license revocation and interlock 
restriction demonstrates a pattern of criminal conduct, "including] two recent episodes of 
alcohol-related wrongdoing" for probable cause. SRB 34-36. It assumes the revocation 
and restriction related to separate criminal events. See_ icL_ But its assumptions are 
inconsistent with the prosecutor's representations in the trial court. See R. 274:21-22 
(stating the revocation and restriction may be imposed simultaneously; and 
acknowledging the affidavit failed to indicate any criminal conviction). Walker's history 
fails to add to the probable cause analysis for several reasons. 
First, the prosecutor in the trial court acknowledged that the information from the 
background check was vague. When the judge stated that the driver's license may have 
been revoked "20 years ago," R. 273:18, the prosecutor did not dispute the ambiguity; 
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rather, he agreed that based on the warrant affidavit, "we don't have anything." R. 273: 
19. In addition, a second prosecutor suggested Walker was required to install the inter-
lock device "two years ago." R. 274:21. But even if an official ordered the restriction 
"two years ago," there is no information about Walker's conduct. There is no indication 
whether she was arrested or when; and no information whether the restriction and 
revocation were related to any criminal proceeding. See R. 78, 88. 
In trial court proceedings, the prosecutor "completely agree[d]" that officers may 
have had a "ton" of information about Walker's history but they did not include it in the 
affidavit. R. 273:19. The lack of information is puzzling since Adamson had years of 
experience, R. 77, and he waited for "a significant time" after the accident to meet with 
Walker. SRB 34. Under the circumstances, the prosecutor admitted, "[w]e are stuck" 
with the lack of information; "[tjhere may have been more." R. 273:19. Indeed, the 
history suggests a single event that may have occurred more than a year before this 
accident, a resolution of revoked and restricted privileges, and nothing more. Se<e R. 88; 
United States v. Prideaux-Wentz, 543 F.3d 954, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2008) (the government's 
failure to include dates in the affidavit as to when the defendant uploaded child porn 
resulted in stale information because il "could have easily obtained" the facts); State v. 
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 15, 100 P.3d 1222 (officers may not "omit information that 
'materially affects the finding of probable cause'") (cite omitted). 
Second, the State suggests the licensing restrictions could have been "imposed no 
more than three months before the accident." SRB 35. Yet, as stated supra, the affidavit 
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makes no reference to that timeline. R. 78, 88.9 Moreover, the affidavit makes no re-
ference to ongoing impaired behavior to link past events with recent conduct. Id_ Rather, 
the affidavit shows that Walker had an unspecified, isolated, past incident resulting in a 
revoked license for alcohol and restricted privileges, but no facts to suggest an ongoing 
pattern to connect those earlier unspecified events to the circumstances here. M 
Third, under Utah law, the ambiguous history adds nothing to the analysis. In 
State v. Brooks, the defendant had been the target of a narcotics investigation for some 
time before officers requested a warrant to search his home. 849 P.2d 640, 641-44 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). In addition, his criminal record supported a series of arrests over eight 
years with the most recent arrest two years before officers applied for the warrant. IcL at 
642. The Utah Court of Appeals stated the history did "nothing to establish that [Brooks 
was] currently dealing in controlled substances," particularly since the most recent arrest 
was "two years prior to the events in the case at bar." IcL at 644. It was not properly part 
of the probable cause determination. IdL\ see also State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 288, K 
12 n.6, 191 P.3d 835 (if the history relates to events "five to fourteen years" before the 
affidavit, it may be irrelevant, while a more recent history may be relevant). 
In this case, Adamson failed to include information about an offense or even the 
9
 In the Court of Appeals, the State claimed the interlock restriction may have been 
imposed in connection with events that "occurred no more than thirteen months before 
the accident." Br. of Appellee, 17. Since the affidavit failed to identify dates or facts, the 
State attorney, the county prosecutors, and the trial court have been unable to settle on a 
specific timeline in this case. See_ SRB 35; Br. of Appellee 17; R. 273:18 (the license 
may have been revoked "20 years ago"); 273:19 ("We are stuck. . . [tjhere may have been 
more"); 274:21 (Walker may have been required to install the interlock device 2 years 
earlier). 
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date of final disposition for the license revocation and restriction. See_ R. 88. Since the 
restrictions may have related to an isolated incident more than a year earlier, and absent 
facts supporting ongoing criminal conduct, the ambiguities fail to support that "evidence 
of a crime [would] be found" in Walker's blood at the time of the warrant request. Gates, 
462 U.S. at 238. "Because the affidavit [did] not state when" or if Walker was arrested or 
when restrictions went into place, "we have no way to determine if 'so much time has 
elapsed that there is no longer probable cause to believe that the evidence is still at the 
targeted locale."' State v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, f 13, 81 P.3d 783 (cite omitted). 
Fourth, while Adamson may have had probable cause to arrest Walker for driving 
on a restricted and revoked license, the probable cause for the driving offenses is distin-
guishable from the probable cause for evidence of substance use at the time of the 
warrant affidavit. The probable cause for the driving offenses related to driving without 
reference to impairment - Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-518.2(3) (2007) (making it a crime 
for a restricted person to drive without an interlock device); 53-3-227 (2007) (making it a 
crime for a person to drive on a revoked license) - while the probable cause for the 
warrant should have focused on evidence of substance use or impairment. See_ Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(g) (2007). But there was no indication of drug use or impairment. See 
78, 88; supra n.8. And the probable cause for the arrests "was not the same probable 
cause necessary to conduct a search of a person's body. This is because probable cause 
to conduct a search involves a concept foreign to the probable cause required to justify 
[the] arrest[s]: the expectation of privacy." State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, fflf 22-23, 
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156 P.3d 771 (relying on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)); seei&^l*. 
(iv) Walker was not evasive; rather, she cooperated. Adamson revealed that 
when he met with Walker, she provided appropriate answers to basic questions. See_ R. 
88. He did not claim that she was belligerent, uncooperative, or evasive. IcL Although 
she could not remember some details about the accident, that is not suspicious since "the 
trauma of the accident," SRB 37, or a head or serious injury could account for the matter. 
In short, Adamson had extensive experience as an officer investigating crime. R. 
77. While he waited a "significant time," SRB 34, to meet with Walker and to apply for 
a warrant, he disclosed limited information about her and the accident. See_ R. 88. In 
addition, he included cursory information about Walker's licensing history, leaving those 
who have interpreted it to speculate and guess. See supra, n.9. Given the gaps and vague 
information about driving privileges, Adamson prepared the affidavit on an assumption 
or hunch. The affidavit was insufficient to support probable cause to believe that 
evidence of crime would be found by drawing Walker's blood. See_ R. 195-96. Since this 
Court looks to federal law only as a floor, this Court may rely on the Utah Constitution to 
rule that the affidavit failed to satisfy the foundational standard and is invalid under state 
law. It may rely solely on a state analysis, and build on that foundational floor for greater 
protections in future cases. 
C. WHILE THE STATE ARGUES FOR AN ANALYSIS OF STATE AND 
FEDERAL LAW THAT PREFERS FEDERAL INTERPRETATIONS, IT ALSO 
ASKS THE COURT TO DEPART FROM FEDERAL LAW AND TO REJECT 
THE REMEDY OF AN EXCLUSIONARY RULE UNDER UTAH LAW. THE 
STATE'S ARGUMENTS LACK SUPPORT. 
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The State claims the interstitial model requires state courts to first enforce federal 
rights. SRB 12, 17. In addition, it claims that a state constitutional analysis "treats 
federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 'as presumptively correct5" unless "'there are 
persuasive reasons to find otherwise.'" IcL 39 (cite omitted); id, 13-14. According to the 
State, a state court may depart from federal analysis "only when historical evidence sug-
gests" a departure. IcL 40. And it claims that "[i]n any event," ijL 48, under the interstitial 
analysis, this Court should abolish the exclusionary rule under Utah law. IcL 49-50. 
The State's arguments for abolishing the exclusionary rule are flawed. 
Specifically, the arguments were not preserved in the trial court and they are not 
adequately briefed here. Se<e infra, Arg. C.(l). In addition, the State disregards history 
and relevant precedent, in favor of case law that has been overruled. See_ infra, Arg. 
C.(2). Indeed, history supports an exclusionary rule as a constitutional mandate in 1896, 
when Utah became a state. Br. of App't, Args. LA. and I.C.10 
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) (evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment is "unconstitutional and void," and "its admission in 
evidence by the court" resulted in "erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings"), 
overruled on other grounds as stated in Warden, Md Penitentiary v. Hay den, 387 U.S. 
294 (1967); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) ("Courts which sit under 
our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the 
constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits 
of such invasions"; a ruling admitting evidence "has the necessary effect of legitimizing 
the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule 
withholds the constitutional imprimatur"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 657, 660 
(1961) (the exclusionary rule is "logically and constitutionally necessary" and "an 
essential part of the right to privacy"; without the exclusionary rule, the "privilege and 
enjoyment" of the rights under the Fourth Amendment would not be available; "the 
exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"; 
the "ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State [without the exclusionary rule] 
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(1) The State Failed to Preserve Its Constitutional Issue in the Trial Court, and 
It Inadequately Briefed the Issue Here. 
The State did not argue in the trial court for elimination of the exclusionary rule 
under Utah law. See R. 147-52; 180-87; 273; 274. Yet this Court has ruled that a state 
constitutional claim must be raised "'to a level of consciousness' that allows the trial 
court an adequate opportunity to address it." Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f^ 16 (cite omitted). 
Although an appellee is not held to the same preservation standard as an appellant when 
making a new argument on appeal, an appellee still must show that the new issue is 
"apparent on the record." Bailey, 2002 UT 58, f 10 (cite omitted). In addition, adequate 
briefing is "essential." State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Adequate briefing involves more than bald citation to authority and an assertion 
for a desired outcome; it requires reasoned analysis. See_ State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^  
14, 99 P.3d 820; State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998); Burton Lumber v. 
Graham, 2008 UT App 207, \ 17 n.5, 186 P.3d 1012 (one-sentence assertion is 
inadequate); State v. Dennis, 2007 UT App 266,113, 167 P.3d 528 (bare assertion is 
inadequate for a "complex issue"). Moreover, since the State's argument to abolish the 
rule would require this Court to overrule precedent, the State has "a substantial burden of 
tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the 
people rest"); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (a conviction based on 
ill-gotten evidence "'cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves 
accomplices in willful disobedience of law.' Even less should the federal courts be 
accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold"); 
United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) (an official, who allows illegally 
obtained evidence, "[will] affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open 
defiance" of the Constitution), overruled on other grounds by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. 
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persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). It must convince the 
Court that existing law is "erroneous" and "more good than harm will come by departing 
from precedent." Id at 399 (cite omitted). The State has failed in its burden here. 
Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has upheld the exclusionary rule as a 
remedy under Utah law. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419. Notwithstanding, the State claims 
that exclusion is improper because framers of the Utah Constitution chose to follow lan-
guage in the Fourth Amendment, SRB 49-50; framers did not include language to provide 
for a remedy, but instead, left the remedy to the legislature, id, 50; exclusion "was not 
required" for a search-and-seizure violation under common law or in 1896, id. 49; 
Thompson lacked analysis, id^ 48; and illegal government activity did not affect the ad-
missibility of evidence in State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923). SRB 49-50. n 
Significantly, the State has not discussed relevant language of the Utah Constitu-
tion. SRB 48-50. It has not explained why framers would be "satisfied" with federal law 
in 1896, id, 25 & 49, but would specifically reject the exclusionary rule upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1886. IdL 49; see supra, n.10. It has not discussed legi-
slative attitudes or the common law of search and seizure. SRB 49-50. And it has not 
demonstrated that "more good than harm will come" from abolishing the exclusionary 
rule in Utah. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 (cite omitted). The State's arguments qualify as a 
list of one-sentence statements followed by citations without reasoned analysis. See SRB 
49-50. Its bare assertions are inadequate. Green, 2004 UT 76, f^ 14; Thomas, 961 P.2d at 
11
 The Utah Council on Victims of Crime has made similar arguments in its brief. 
See_ Br. of Amicus, 1-31. 
30 
305; Burton Lumber, 2008 UT App 207, f 17 n.5; Dennis, 2007 UT App 266, Tf 13.12 
(2) The Utah Constitution, Historical Circumstances, and Common Law 
Support the Exclusionary Rule. 
Contrary to the State's assertions, (a) historical context supports suppression as a 
constitutional rule in 1896, when Utah became a state; (b) the Utah Constitution 
supports remedies for constitutional violations; (c) this Court has inherent and supreme 
power to ensure that a citizen's state constitutional rights are not violated; (d) this 
Court's decision in Aime is no longer good law; (e) common law provides remedies for a 
violation of a citizen's most cherished rights; (f) Thompson properly supports an 
exclusionary rule under Utah law; and (g) the exclusionary rule is good policy. 
(a) In 1896, Constitutional Law Supported an Exclusionary Rule. The United 
States Supreme Court recognized suppression as a constitutional remedy ten years 
before Utah became a state. See Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). As stated in the Brief of 
App't, Arg. LA., the Supreme Court described the principles of the search-and-seizure 
provision as the "very essence of constitutional liberty and security," applying to "all 
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's 
home and the privacies of life." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. The Court looked to the Fifth 
Amendment as providing the constitutional remedy for a violation of the Fourth 
12
 If the State intended to rely on the Utah Council on Victims of Crime ("UCVC") 
to provide the necessary analysis, that reliance is misplaced. Under Utah law, when a 
party fails to adequately brief an issue, this Court may refuse to reach the merits, and it 
may reject the arguments raised by amici. See Green, 2004 UT 76, ^f 35-36. In addition, 
if a party fails to preserve an issue in the trial court, this Court may refuse to address the 
issue in the amicus brief. See Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 50, ^  7, 975 P.2d 946, 
superseded on other grounds in Gordon v. Maughan, 2009 UT App 25, 204 P.3d 189. 
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Amendment. It stated, "[T]he 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the 
fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give 
evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the fifth 
amendment." IcL at 633. And where the Fifth Amendment states, "no person 'shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,'" id. dXGl\, it is an 
express rule of exclusion. The Court conceptually married the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments to prevent the government from using a man's papers as evidence against 
him where the papers were illegally seized. M at 630, 633, 638; Br. of App't, Arg. LA. 
The Boyd case supports that "by the time the framers of the Utah Constitution 
gathered," State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, \ 15, 232 P.3d 519, the United States Supreme 
Court had recognized the exclusionary rule as part of the constitutional right under 
search-and-seizure law. "That decision put Utahfs founders on notice of the federal 
interpretation." IcL The framers included provisions in the Utah Constitution similar to 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, thus, laying the foundation for a constitutional exclu-
sionary rule. Indeed, Utah's own "Fifth Amendment" is more protective than the federal 
counterpart, and states, "[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself." Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (emphasis added). This Court may look to relevant 
federal provisions and case law supporting an exclusionary rule in 1896, see supra n.10, 
for guidance in affirming the Utah exclusionary rule. See also Br. of App't, Arg. I.C. 
(b) Additional Provisions in the Utah Constitution Support a Remedy for a 
Constitutional Violation. The text of the Utah Constitution supports judicial 
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enforcement of the constitutional provisions and a remedy for a violation. Article I, § 
14, states that "no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause." The framers of the 
Utah Constitution did not require legislation to trigger the protections of that provision. 
See, e.g., Utah Const, art, XXII, § 1 (requiring legislation for the homestead exemption). 
Indeed, as this Court has ruled, state constitutions "are not grants of power to" - but are 
"limitations" on - legislative power. Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 
P.2dl61, 167 (Utah 1933).13 
In addition, the Utah Constitution expressly states that the provisions of the 
Declaration of Rights are mandatory and prohibitory. Utah Const, art. I, § 26. In that 
regard, the constitution mandates probable cause for a warrant and prohibits the issuance 
of a warrant if probable cause is lacking. IcL at art. I, § 14. "[F]ull force and effect must 
be given every provision [of the state constitution] where this can be done." Wadsworth, 
28 P.2d at 167; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 11 (ensuring that every person shall have a 
remedy - without unnecessary delay - "for an injury done to him in his person, property, 
or reputation"). Moreover, framers intended the broadest protections for citizens under 
the Utah Constitution. See also, supra Arg. A.(2). 
(c) This Court Has Supreme Authority to Ensure the Protections of the Utah 
Constitution. As the United States Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Marbury v. 
Madison, when a constitution creates a right, it is subject to being looked into by judges. 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); see also 2 Proceedings 1521 ("the supreme court 
13
 The legislature would not be prohibited from enacting its own adequate and 
effective remedy for a constitutional violation, subject to review by this Court. 
33 
will interpret this [state] Constitution"). "Rights guaranteed by our state constitution are 
to be carefully protected by the courts." State v. Tuttle. 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985); 
Thompson, 810 P.2d at 421 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (this Court has a "peculiar 
obligation to protect" state constitutional rights); State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 
100, 109 (1924) ("It is for the courts, where their offices are invoked, to temper excess 
by enforcing the restraints which the law imposes for the peaceful orderly conduct of 
affairs"); see also supra n. 1. This Court has inherent and supervisory powers over the 
courts to ensure justice and fairness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266, 1271-72 
(Utah 1993). It has the power and authority to issue all orders necessary to the 
determination of any cause. Utah Const, art. VIII, §§ 1, 2, 3 (vesting judicial power in 
the supreme court; identifying the supreme court as the highest court; providing the 
supreme court with original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law); Ka Pa 'akai O 
Ka 'Aina v. Land Use Com fn, 1 P.3d 1068, 1078 (Hawai'i 2000) ("this court is the 
'ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce'" 
the state constitution) (cite omitted). In that regard, this Court has the authority to affirm 
the exclusionary rule as a constitutional mandate. 
(d) Aime Is No Longer Good Law. The State relies on Aime to argue for 
elimination of the exclusionary rule. SRB 50. But Aime has been overruled, see 
Law ceo, 194 P.2d at 471, and is not persuasive authority. In Aime, the State charged the 
defendant with violating liquor laws. 220 P. at 704. Prior to trial, the State conceded 
that the warrant used for evidence was illegal. IdL at 705. Thus, the Court addressed 
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whether illegally-seized evidence was admissible at trial. IcL It cited to a "general rule" 
and stated, "[T]he admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means 
through which it has been obtained." IcL Also, the Court claimed that "practically all 
American courts" had "approved and applied" the "general rule." IcL In support of that 
proposition, the Court cited to Professor Wigmore, who took it upon himself to 
"vigorously assail[]" the doctrine of exclusion, id^, and the Court cited to cases from 25 
states, including Idaho, Iowa, and Oklahoma. IcL at 706. But see Owens, 259 S.W. at 
106 (of the list compiled by the state's attorney, "only 12 states" unequivocally rejected 
the exclusionary rule as of 1924, including Utah). 
Also, the Court relied on excerpts from several cases to claim that evidence should 
be assessed for admissibility based on its credibility and probative value and not based 
on whether it was illegally seized.14 Airne, 220 P. at 706-08. Notably, the Utah Supreme 
Court made no reference to any provision of the Utah Constitution or to Utah law for its 
analysis. See icL at 704-08. It did not address plain language, case law in effect at state-
hood, convention debates, or policy reasons for the /20/2-exclusion rule in Utah. IcL But 
see Salt Lake City v. Wight, 60 Utah 108, 205 P. 900, 903 (1922) ("in a proper case, the 
trial court would be justified in making an order suppressing evidence [collected in an 
illegal search,] and even going so far as to order that intoxicating liquor be destroyed so 
14
 Today Utah law protects all kinds of private information from use at trial without 
consideration for its probative value. Indeed, the State and the Utah Council on Victims 
of Crime have been on the other side of the debate on that issue, arguing that potentially 
probative evidence may be kept from defendants under Utah's evidentiary privileges. 
See e.g.. State v. Worthen, 2009 UT 79, fflf 50 n.9 & 51, 222 P.3d 1144. 
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as to preclude its being used as evidence against one who is criminally accused"). 
Moreover, contrary to this Court's ruling in Aime, closer inspection supports that 
several states in the early twentieth century excluded evidence obtained in violation of 
search-and-seizure provisions, including Idaho, Iowa, and Oklahoma, among others.15 
According to one court, "Security from [an] unlawful search is the right guaranteed to 
the citizen, even for the discovery of the citizen's sins. This right we must protect, unless 
we may with impunity disregard our oath to support and enforce the Constitution." 
Hughes v. State, 238 S.W. 588, 594 (Tenn. 1922). 
Aime is no longer good law. Changing attitudes and discerning analysis support a 
state exclusionary rule: It may be "enough to say it has had the sanction of [a majority 
of] all American courts." Aime, 220 P. at 705; see also Owens, 259 S.W. at 102; 19 
A.L.R.5th 470, § 3[a] (1994) (listing 28 states with an exclusionary rule as of 1994). 
15
 See State v. Myers, 36 Idaho 396, 211 P. 440, 445, 441-42 (1922) (three justices in 
the concurring opinion support exclusion as set forth in Weeks v. United States', and two 
justices in the lead opinion reject the exclusionary rule); State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730, 
731 (Iowa 1903) (Iowa supports exclusion); Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P. 
545, 547-48 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923) (Oklahoma supports the exclusionary rule and 
summarizes cases giving reasons for the rule). In Larocco, this Court recognized that 
prior to Mapp v. Ohio, many states held "that exclusion was required as a matter of state 
constitutional law when police conduct violated constitutional guarantees against 
unreasonable search and seizure," 794 P.2d at 472; and "[a]t least eighteen states" had 
adopted an independent state constitutional exclusionary rule. Id, 
In addition, in 1924, the Missouri Supreme Court analyzed cases purportedly 
rejecting the exclusionary rule and considered them to be "neither numerous nor 
consistent with each other." Owens, 259 S.W. at 105. It also considered them to be 
"broken" by "inadequate reasons" and "strong dissents." IcL at 106 (citing examples). 
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(e) Common Law and Early Law Paved the Way for Exclusion, At common law, 
an individual's papers and effects were "'often the dearest property a man [could] 
have/" and "'the law never force[d] evidence from the party in whose power it is.'" 
State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 A. 1046, 1049 (1896) (Baldwin, J., concurring) 
(quoting Entick v. Carrinzton, 2 Wils. 275, 291, 292); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627-28. In 
addition, the law precluded "the seizure of one's papers in order to obtain evidence 
against him." Griswold, 34 A. at 1049 (Baldwin, J., concurring). Likewise, it did not 
allow officials to invade a person's privacy with a search "for the sole purpose of 
obtaining evidence against him," unless the search was for evidence that "the public or 
the [prosecuting] complainant ha[d] an interest in." Id_ For example, a complainant 
making a charge of theft could obtain a warrant to search for stolen property that did not 
lawfully belong to the accused.16 See, Boyd, 116 U.S. at 628. 
Also, common law provided remedies for a violation of a citizen's most cherished 
rights. Blackstone declared that "every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and 
every injury its proper redress." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163 (citing 3 William 
Blackstone); see also Utah Const, art. I, § 11. Anglo-American traditions recognized 
that a remedy was fair and just if it placed the parties in the position they would have 
been absent the breach or violation. See, e.g.. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 
16
 Early Utahns felt strongly about property rights as can be seen in the convention de-
bates for art. I, § 22. See 1 Proceedings 625, 628, 633 (Thurman: "There is nothing more 
sacred than the right of property, unless it be the right to live and enjoy your liberty"; 
Maloney: "And above all things in this world, I say protect the owner of this property"; 
Thoreson: "I am in favor and I believe the citizens of the Territory of Utah demand of us 
that we guard their interests, guard their lives, their liberty and their property"). 
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395, 402 (1946) (when imposing an equitable remedy, the court acts in the highest 
traditions in the "public interest by restoring the status quo and ordering the return of 
that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant"). In addition, early cases 
dealing with search-and-seizure violations prosecuted constables and magistrates as 
common trespassers or tortfeasors. See Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (Conn. 1814) 
(upholding trespass convictions for a justice and constable, who issued and executed 
illegal warrants); Griswold, 34 A. at 1049 ("common law was ready to supply a remedy 
for any unreasonable search or seizure, by an action of trespass against the individuals 
who made it") (Baldwin, J., concurring); Hubbard v. Lord, 59 Tex. 384 (1883) (if an 
officer seizes a person "without warrant, or with one palpably illegal, or issued without 
authority of law, he commits a trespass"). 
But as Judge Baldwin pointed out in 1896, magistrates and constables are "officers 
of the law, charged with the execution of a trust confided to them" by the "authority of, 
the state." Griswold, 34 A. at 1049 (Baldwin, J., concurring). They are not common 
trespassers. Thus, according to Baldwin, when government agents violate constitutional 
rights, the constitutional guarantee should be designed to protect the citizen "in a way 
that would repress the wrongful act most efficiently." Id^ Where common law provided 
a remedy for an "unreasonable search or seizure, by an action of trespass," the 
declaration of rights "would be meaningless, if it did not seek to do more than this." Id. 
(emphasis added). Judge Baldwin argued against the use of illegally seized evidence in 
criminal cases. Id/, see also Grumon, 1 Conn. 40 (if the warrant is illegal, "no person 
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could be arrested under it" and the case "stands on no better ground than it would if 
there had been no process"; "[i]t is coram nonjudice"). 
Officers and magistrates today are not prosecuted for illegal warrants and arrests. 
They enjoy governmental immunity from prosecution for their trespasses and other 
actions. See Gov't Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. Tit. 63G, Ch. 7 (2008 & Supp. 
2010). Consequently, the trespass and tortfeasor remedies of early law are no longer 
relevant. Rather, in the words of Judge Baldwin, a more efficient remedy "represses] 
the wrongful act" "without seeming to allow the state to profit by its own wrong," 
Griswold, 34 A. at 1049 (Baldwin, J., concurring): the exclusionary rule. 
(f) Utah Law Supports the Exclusionary Rule Set Forth in Thompson. In DeBooy, 
this Court ruled that without the Utah exclusionary rule, the guarantees of the search-and-
seizure provision would be "nothing more than a form of words." 2000 UT 32, f^ 33 n.12 
(citations omitted). It recognized that the exclusionary rule adequately protects the 
personal nature of the guarantees set forth at art. I, § 14, and the right to be "let alone -
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." IcL. fflf 32, 
33 (citation omitted). In Larocco, the Court stated that art. I, § 14, supports an 
"expectation of privacy," and the "exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary 
consequence of police violations" of that provision. 794 P.2d at 469, 472; see_ Brake, 
2004 UT 95, f 25 (citing to Larocco with approval on state law grounds). It recognized 
that the exclusionary rule is "fundamental" to the analysis: if evidence is illegally seized, 
"its exclusion would be inevitably required." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472; see also State v. 
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Tram, 2002 UT 97, f^ 23, 57 P.3d 1052 (when constitutional rights are violated, evidence 
"must typically be excluded" from the criminal trial); State ex rel A.R. v. C.R., 1999 UT 
43, f 19, 982 P.2d 73 (the fourth amendment exclusionary rule compels "'respect for the 
constitutional guaranty'" "'by removing the incentive to disregard it'") (cite omitted). 
In Sims v. Collection Division of the Utah State Tax Comm X the Court held that 
the exclusionary rule provides "a significant and substantial additional deterrent to 
unconstitutional seizures." 841 P.2d 6, 14 & n. 15 (Utah 1992). And in Abell the Court 
did not hesitate to apply the exclusionary rule when a magistrate-issued checkpoint plan 
failed to protect a citizen's expectations of privacy. 2003 UT 20, Tflf 39-41. Utah's 
exclusionary rule serves the same constitutional and fundamental purposes reflected in 
early federal law. See_ Br. of App't, Args. LA. & I.C.; supra n.10. It ensures that 
proceedings are within the due processes of law; protects the privacy rights of individuals 
against unlawful intrusions; returns officials to the position they were in before the 
violation; holds each branch of government accountable; encourages lawfulness in the 
warrant process; preserves the integrity of the judiciary by ensuring courts are not 
complicit in constitutional violations; and deters unlawful conduct by officers and judges 
alike. See Br. of App't, Arg. I.C.(3).17 
The State disagrees and cites to Beller v. Rolfe, 2008 UT 68, f 11 & n.2, 194 P.3d 
17
 Courts in other states have relied on similar factors in recognizing a state 
exclusionary rule. See Br. of App't, Arg. I.C.(4) (citing cases from other jurisdictions); 
see also State v. Bonds, 653 P.2d 1024, 1030-31 (Wash 1982) (an independent state 
exclusionary rule protects an individual's privacy rights, deters future conduct, and 
preserves the integrity of the judiciary). 
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949, to claim this Court suggested that "Utah's exclusionary rule" is a "judicial construct 
without a constitutional pedigree." SRB 51. Yet, in Better, this Court cited to the 
"Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution" when it stated that the 
exclusionary rule is "without a constitutional pedigree". 2008 UT 68, ^ f 11. In a separate 
note, it stated that an exclusionary rule "independently exists" under Utah law and the 
Utah rule "'permits us to benefit from federal analysis without being bound by it in our 
construction of the Utah Constitution.'" IcL at ]f 11 n.2 (cite omitted). The State has taken 
language in Beller out of context to denigrate the underpinnings for the Utah rule.18 
(g) The Exclusionary Rule Is Good Policy. Courts across the nation have used the 
exclusionary rule as the principal and principled instrument to enforce the search-and-
seizure provisions. See supra, nn. 10, 15. The rule ensures fairness, another 
constitutional mandate. See_ Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (ensuring due process). "Fairness can 
be assured by placing the State and the accused in the same positions they would have 
been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
18
 The State asserts that the exclusionary rule is not applicable in most civil cases. 
SRB 51. There may be several reasons for applying the rule only in [quasi-]criminal 
cases. For example, when an unreasonable search fails to produce evidence, there is 
nothing to suppress. See, e.g. Maudsley v. State, 816 A.2d 189, 192 (N.J. 2003) (no 
evidence was found). Also, a "seizure" qualifies as an "arrest," which is specific to 
criminal cases. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 36, 63 P.3d 650. In addition, when art. 
I, § 14, and art. I, § 12, are read together for an exclusionary rule, they apply to the 
accused "[i]n criminal prosecutions." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Moreover, the provisions 
relevant here (art. I, §§ 12, 14) appear with other provisions that apply uniquely in 
criminal cases. See Utah Const, art. I, §§ 8 (addressing bail for persons charged with 
crime), 9 (addressing bail), 10 (addressing jury trials; making particular reference to 
"criminal cases"), 11 (allowing a remedy for any injury; and separately addressing 
protections for "civil" causes), 12 (addressing the rights of the "accused"), 13 (addressing 
prosecution by information or indictment), 14 (addressing searches and seizures). 
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447 (1984) (Burger, C.J., opinion) (discussing rationale for the inevitable discovery 
doctrine). The exclusionary rule allows a court to reach the issue in the context in which 
it arose - that is, the criminal investigation - without requiring the parties to initiate 
additional, time-consuming, collateral proceedings to vindicate a constitutional right. 
It serves to cure a violation as effectively as any remedy at law: it places the 
parties in the position they were in before the violation; it renders the illegally seized 
evidence unconstitutional and void. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638. It is a "bulwark against 
governmental disregard for constitutionally protected privacy rights." State v. Carter, 
370 S.E.2d 553, 559 (N.C. 1988); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (N.M. 1993) 
(once a state constitutional violation has been established, "we do no more than return 
the parties to where they stood before the right was violated"). It restores faith in the 
system, and ensures that officials, who are sworn to uphold the constitution, will not 
benefit from an unconstitutional process. The rule ensures that the search for truth is 
conducted with integrity by a moral and constitutional system. It is the price a society 
pays to be free from unreasonable government intrusions. 
While the State acknowledges that the exclusionary rule provides "an appropriate 
balance," SRB 52 & 54, it also disputes the constitutional purposes of the exclusionary 
rule, and claims it exists "because of its deterrent effect." Id, 51. The UCVC, on the 
other hand, claims the "deterrent effect" of the exclusionary rule "is highly debatable" 
since no one knows if the rule actually deters. Br. of Amicus 25. In addition, the 
UCVC claims that a state exclusionary rule "doubles the confusion" for officers 
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involved in investigating criminal conduct. I(L 23. It claims that state and federal 
agencies share investigations and resources, and if Utah has a separate exclusionary rule, 
the separate agencies will not know which law applies to the investigation. IcL 24. The 
UCVC urges this Court to simplify search-and-seizure law. IcL 25. 
Walker has also requested simplification of the law. But her argument for 
simplification focuses on the constitutional mandates. Where the constitution guarantees 
that every person shall be free from an unreasonable search, officials must abide. Where 
the constitution requires a warrant to be supported by an affidavit of probable cause, that 
language is plain. If a government official violates the plain language of the provision, 
evidence is excluded. Se(? supra n.10. When officials charged with enforcing the law 
fail to understand the law, that is not acceptable. See_ United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 
1238, 1246 n.9 (10th Cir. 2006). A reasonable officer knows the law. Pray v. City of 
Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154, 1158 (6th Cir. 1995) (search-and-seizure rights "are clearly 
established rights of which a reasonable official would know"). A government agent's 
motivations should be found in the document he is sworn to uphold: the constitution. 
Utah courts have applied the exclusionary rule to remedy police violations, magis-
trate-sanctioned conduct, and legislation. See State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, f^ 46, 227 P.3d 
1251; DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ffif 32-33; Abell 2003 UT 20, ffif 39-41; State v. Mendoza, 
748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987); State v. Vasquez-Marquez, 2009 UT App 14, ffif 8-9, 204 
P.3d 178. The rule serves as an important check on all branches of government. 
(3) The Utah Constitution Does Not Permit a Warrant that Lacks Probable 
Cause But Is Supported by Good Faith. 
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The State claims if the Utah exclusionary rule endures, this Court should adopt a 
good-faith exception similar to the federal exception. SRB 50. In connection with that 
claim, it suggests the Utah rule lacks a "'constitutional pedigree"' Id, 51 (citing Better). 
But see supra, p. 41. It asserts that Utah's rule lends itself to the good-faith exception 
because the exclusionary rule generally applies in [quasi-]criminal proceedings. SRB 51. 
But see supra n.18. It claims the state exclusionary rule targets only police conduct, and 
for that reason, the good-faith exception should apply. SRB 51. But see supra, Arg. 
C.(2)(g). It cites to Aime to assert that government misconduct "ought not to hamper" 
criminal investigations. SRB 52. But see supra, Arg. C.(2)(d). And it claims the good-
faith exception "reinforces the constitution's preference for warrants." SRB 53. 
Yet warrants sanctioned under the good-faith exception necessarily lack "probable 
cause," the standard mandated by the constitution. Utah Const, art. I, § 14. Indeed, the 
good-faith exception - if adopted - would effectively replace the probable-cause 
requirement in the constitution and erode the protection. See People v. Sundling, 395 
N.W.2d 308, 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Russo, 
487 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. 1992). It would "encourage lax practices by government 
officials in all three branches of government," State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 290 (Iowa 
2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001); 
frustrate the purpose of the search-and-seizure provision; and place "a premium" on 
"illegal police action[s] and a positive incentive" for others "to engage in similar lawless 
acts in the future." People v. Bizelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1985). 
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While the State makes reference to the '"substantial social costs'" of exclusion, 
SRB 53 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and its progeny), courts 
have questioned the validity of that argument where it was used to justify the Leon 
exception, stating the statistics "show that the costs of the exclusionary rule[, as] 
demonstrated by dropped prosecutions and lost convictions[, are] really quite low." 
Sundlinz, 395 N.W.2d at 314; State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 675 (Idaho 1992) (the cost 
of excluding evidence has already been minimized by the "totality of the circumstances" 
analysis in Gates). Also, exclusion is not a "cost": it merely places the state in the 
position it was in before the violation. Guzman, 842 P.2d at 675. 
Moreover, the State claims that the good-faith exception is fundamentally sound 
and straightforward: it ensures that officials do not profit from their misconduct because 
it "is not [a] boundless" exception. SRB 53. Yet the good-faith exception is an example 
of another "result-driven" federal nuance, Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 28, recently devised in 
the last 25 years to apply "rather opportunistically," Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 
931 n.36, in order to place "a large percentage of illegal activities beyond the scrutiny of 
the courts." Thompson, 810 P.2d at 420-21 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). On the other 
hand, the exclusionary rule is a straightforward remedy. If a search is conducted in 
violation of the constitution, evidence is suppressed. 
In Rodriguez, this Court reiterated a preference for warrants when officers seek a 
blood sample. 2007 UT 15, fflf 38-41. In Tripp, it demonstrated a commitment to the 
principles of the search-and-seizure provision by suppressing evidence when the methods 
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used for obtaining the sample are unconstitutional. 2010 UT 9, fflf 60-61. Since the 
constitution requires "probable cause" for a warrant, a judicial standard that supplants the 
requirement with a "good faith" standard is not a constitutional standard, but is less. 
In this case, prosecutors and the trial court agreed the warrant affidavit was terrible 
due to Adamson's limited investigation. Se& supra, Arg. B.(l). That affidavit should not 
be immune from challenge under the good-faith exception. See_ State v. Novembrino, 
519 A.2d 820, 855-57 (N.J. 1987). Where the constitution provides that a warrant must 
be supported by probable cause, a warrant that fails that standard is no warrant at all. 
D. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION AS SET FORTH IN LEON CANNOT 
SALVAGE THE SEARCH HERE. 
The standard for probable cause is well-established: it is met when the facts and 
circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable prudence to believe that "evidence 
of crime will be found in a particular place." See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see supra, Arg. 
B.(2). In this case, Detective Adamson had years of experience as an officer. R. 77. In 
addition, both he and the magistrate were involved in the use of the invalid warrant: 
Adamson drafted the paperwork and executed the warrant, and the magistrate issued the 
warrant. R. 77-91. Yet Adamson's affidavit lacked investigation and the requisite 
probable cause; it was based on guesswork, assumptions, a hunch. See_ supra, Arg. B.(2). 
Under the circumstances, "the officer [had] no reasonable grounds for believing that the 
warrant was properly issued." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. He "could not have harbored an 
objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause." IdL at 926; supra, Arg. 
B. Moreover, when the magistrate issued the warrant based on the deficient affidavit, he 
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abandoned ms io!c. See Leon, 4uh l Lv at VJJI, Mi ui A pp I, 4 "l.\ k. .! , v2S, 11 
affV •• -»l:j. • •! s: ilv.-officer's and the magistrate's 
reliance thereon was unreasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; supra, Arg. B. 
In the event Adamson magistrate believed the warrant WOILU imm.ii,., / a 
] - « * • • ••/' ..i: ' - > k t .V^/e v. jlarsaitL .-" ** 
A.2d 58, 67 (Conn. 1990) (under the good-faith exception, police are concerned only 
with getting a warrant and not with probable cause). The process was inadequate under a 
good-lailh skiiitb" ' IIMI '"< W .IS IIIU t >11s1111• 11<<• > il limit*' ih< : iMr-i .uisr "U|UIM im nl. 
SeeBr. oi* VpM. V**: I!: ^/>/Y/ -\P- B. 1 o allow the good-faith exception in a case 
where the affidavit was so constitutionally inept would make a mockery of the warrant 
process urged in Rodriguez and mandated., by the constitutioi I. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Brief of Appellant, Walker respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court ^ ruling un ;he motion to suppress. 
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